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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
An Administrative Law Judge held that Lisa Schaudeck 
did not prove that she was disabled for a continuous 
twelve-month period by Hodgkin's Disease, and the District 
Court affirmed this decision. See Schaudeck v. Apfel, No. 
Civ.A.97-2718 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 1998). Schaudeck argues 
that the ALJ improperly determined that her impairment 
did not meet the criteria of an impairment listed in 
Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, of the 
regulations and failed to properly consider the effects of her 
chemotherapy treatments and her substantive testimony. 
We will reverse and remand the cause for a rehearing. 
 
I. 
 
Schaudeck was first diagnosed with Hodgkin's Disease in 
1990. She was treated and the disease went into remission. 
Her symptoms recurred in 1993, and in early 1994, she 
began a year-long course of chemotherapy. She alleges 
that, on February 7, 1994, she became disabled by the 
disease and treatment and thereafter met the insured 
status requirements of the Social Security Act until June 
30, 1998. Although she worked as a hairdresser from 1981 
until 1992 and as a waitress for three to five months in 
1993, Schaudeck has not worked since. 
 
At her hearing before the ALJ, Schaudeck testified to 
significant problems resulting from her chemotherapy 
treatments. She testified that, among other things, they 
caused fatigue, sickness and nausea. App. at 162. She also 
testified to residual effects that continued after the 
chemotherapy, such as having very little energy, tiring 
easily, and having to take regular naps. App. at 150, 153, 
155, 164. In addition, she stated that she had frequent 
stomach, leg and chest cramps and that the bottom of one 
leg was numb. App. at 151-52. 
 
The ALJ found that Schaudeck had been disabled from 
February 7, 1994, until approximately August 31, 1994, 
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but that she was not disabled thereafter. In reaching this 
conclusion, the ALJ relied on a consulting doctor's report 
indicating that Schaudeck's Hodgkin's Disease was 
"responding to" the chemotherapy treatments. The ALJ 
thus denied her claim, holding that she had not shown a 
period of disability continuing for more than twelve months. 
The Appeals Council denied her request for review, and the 
District Court affirmed the ALJ's decision. 
 
Schaudeck alleges that the ALJ erred by: (1) holding that 
her impairment did not meet or equal a listed impairment 
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (2) failing to 
properly evaluate the medical evidence and her subjective 
complaints of pain; and (3) failing to consider her non- 
exertional impairments. We have plenary review of all legal 
issues, see Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d 
Cir. 1995), and review the ALJ's findings of fact to 
determine whether they are supported by substantial 
evidence. See 42 U.S.C. S 405(g). Overall, the substantial 
evidence standard is deferential and includes deference to 
inferences drawn from the facts if they, in turn, are 
supported by substantial evidence. See Monsour Med. Ctr. 
v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986). To 
determine whether a finding is supported by substantial 
evidence, we must review the record as a whole. See 5 
U.S.C. S 706. 
 
II. 
 
A social security insurance benefits claimant must 
demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can 
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 
12 months." 42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(2)(A). The Commissioner 
evaluates each case according to a five-step process until a 
finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" is made. See 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1520(a). The sequence is essentially as follows: 
(1) if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial 
gainful employment, she will be found not disabled; (2) if 
the claimant does not suffer from a "severe impairment," 
she will be found not disabled; (3) if a severe impairment 
meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 
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Subpart P, Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last 
continually for at least twelve months, then the claimant 
will be found disabled; (4) if the severe impairment does not 
meet prong (3), the Commissioner considers the claimant's 
residual functional capacity ("RFC") to determine whether 
she can perform work she has done in the past despite the 
severe impairment - if she can, she will be found not 
disabled; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform her past 
work, the Commissioner will consider the claimant's RFC, 
age, education, and past work experience to determine 
whether she can perform other work which exists in the 
national economy. See id. S 404.1520(b)-(f). 
 
Schaudeck was not engaged in substantial gainful 
employment. At the second step, the ALJ determined that 
Schaudeck had established the existence of a "severe 
impairment" related to the Hodgkin's Disease and its 
"residual effects." At the third step, however, the ALJ found 
that the impairment did not meet or equal in severity any 
of those listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulation 
404. At step four, the ALJ considered Schaudeck's RFC and 
found that she could perform her past work of hairdressing 
and waitressing. ALJ's Decision at 3-4; app. at 127-28. 
Thus the ALJ did not reach step five. 
 
A. The listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 
       Appendix 1 
 
Schaudeck alleges that the ALJ erred when he found that 
her Hodgkin's Disease did not meet or equal in severity any 
of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 
Part 404 of the regulations. The list includes "Hodgkin's 
Disease . . . not controlled by prescribed therapy." 20 C.F.R. 
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, S 13.06A (emphasis added).1 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The full definition in the regulations is:"Hodgkin's Disease or non- 
Hodgkin's lymphoma with progressive disease not controlled by 
prescribed therapy." 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, S 13.06A. We 
read the clause "with progressive disease" as describing "non-Hodgkin's 
lymphoma" because Hodgkin's Disease is by definition the "progressive 
enlargement of the lymph nodes, spleen, and general lymphoid tissue." 
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 487 (27th ed. 1988). Thus, for 
our purposes, the relevant term is "Hodgkin's Disease . . . not controlled 
by prescribed therapy." 
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ALJ apparently relied on the report of Dr. Wilchfort, a 
nontreating physician, who wrote that Schaudeck seemed 
to be "responding to" her treatment. From this statement, 
the ALJ found that the Hodgkin's Disease was "controlled 
by" the chemotherapy.2 The issue is whether the ALJ erred 
by concluding that the term "responding to" was equivalent 
to "controlled by." 
 
We conclude that the terms are not synonymous and that 
Schaudeck's disease was not "controlled by" her 
chemotherapy simply because it was "responding to" the 
treatment. We hold that "control," as used here, means that 
the treatment has been so successful that the disease can 
be considered effectively neutralized. Webster's Dictionary 
supports our holding. It defines "to control" as: "to exercise 
restraining or directing influence over . . . to have power 
over . . . to reduce the incidence or severity of especially to 
innocuous levels." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 285 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, the context in which the phrase "controlled 
by" appears in the Appendix is further reinforcement for 
our conclusion that the phrase should signify something 
more than that a treatment is merely affecting the disease. 
Indeed, section 13.06C of the CFR Appendix, which lists 
the various impairments, also lists "[e]pidermoid carcinoma 
in a lymph node in the neck not responding to prescribed 
therapy," 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,S 13.06C 
(emphasis added), thus distinguishing between diseases 
that are "responding to" treatment and those "controlled by" 
it. Each term clearly means something different. Thus, 
simply because Schaudeck's cancer was responding to the 
chemotherapy does not mean that the disease was 
controlled by the treatment. 
 
Because the ALJ considered only evidence indicating that 
Schaudeck's disease was "responding to" treatment, we will 
remand the cause to give the ALJ an opportunity, using 
this definition, to reassess whether Schaudeck's Hodgkin's 
Disease meets or equals in severity the listed impairment of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This finding was not explicit in the ALJ's Decision but can be inferred 
from the ALJ's finding at step three of the evaluative process. 
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"Hodgkin's Disease . . . not controlled by prescribed 
therapy." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,S 13.06A. 
 
B. Evaluating the medical evidence 
 
On remand, should the ALJ again find that Schaudeck's 
Hodgkin's Disease did not meet or equal a listed 
impairment, the ALJ will need to reassess his 
determination that Schaudeck was capable of doing her 
past relevant work despite her severe impairment and make 
more explicit the reasoning behind his conclusion. 
 
An ALJ must give great weight to a claimant's subjective 
testimony of the inability to perform even light or sedentary 
work when this testimony is supported by competent 
medical evidence. See Dobrowolsky v. Califiano, 606 F.2d 
403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979). Although the ALJ can reject such 
claims if he does not find them credible, see Baerga v. 
Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), when 
assessing a claimant's credibility: 
 
       [i]n instances in which the adjudicator has observed 
       the individual, the adjudicator is not free to accept or 
       reject that individual's complaints solely on the basis of 
       such personal observations. Rather, in all cases in 
       which pain or other symptoms are alleged, the 
       determination or decision rationale must contain a 
       thorough discussion and analysis of the objective 
       medical and the other evidence, including the 
       individual's complaints of pain or other symptoms and 
       the adjudicator's personal observations. The rationale 
       must include a resolution of any inconsistencies in the 
       evidence as a whole and set forth a logical explanation 
       of the individual's ability to work. 
 
Social Security Ruling ("S.S.R.") 95-5P, 1995 WL 670415, at 
*2 (emphasis added). 
 
We have reemphasized the need for such specificity, 
holding that the ALJ must indicate in his decision which 
evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the 
basis for his finding. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 
705-06 (3d Cir. 1981); see also S.S.R. 96-7P, 1996 WL 
374186, at *4 ("The reasons for the credibility finding must 
be grounded in the evidence and articulated in the 
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determination or decision."). This explanation provides us 
with a basis on which to assess whether "significant 
probative evidence was not credited or [was] simply 
ignored." Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. Here, the need for 
specificity and articulation is strong because Schaudeck's 
history of chemotherapy supports her subjective claims. 
 
In particular, two flaws in the ALJ's analysis of the 
evidence require reconsideration on remand. First, the ALJ 
failed to consider the support for Schaudeck's testimony 
provided by the numerous medical reports detailing her 
chemotherapy regimen. In the section of the Decision titled 
"The Evidence," the ALJ noted that on December 29, 1994, 
February 9 and March 9, 1995, Schaudeck told her doctors 
that she was "feeling fine" and had no problems. App. at 
126. In addition, the ALJ cited Dr. Wilchfort's report stating 
that Schaudeck was "responding to" the treatment. This, 
however, was the extent of the ALJ's discussion of the 
medical evidence. 
 
The ALJ's complete discussion of Schaudeck's complaints 
was as follows: 
 
        The claimant's subjective complaints of disabling 
       pain and other symptoms and limitation precluding all 
       significant work activity are not credible or consistent 
       with Social Security Ruling 95-5p and Regulations 20 
       CFR 404.1529 and 416.929. Such complaints, beyond 
       a limited period of acute distress at the onset of the 
       disease, cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent 
       with the laboratory findings, medical reports, and daily 
       activities. The above-summarized medical evidence 
       reveals objective findings that, in my opinion, could not 
       reasonably produce the subjective complaints after an 
       acute period of distress lasting six to seven months. 
 
ALJ's Decision at 3 (emphasis added). Of course, the 
"above-summarized medical evidence" consisted solely of 
the two findings noted above and included no discussion 
whatsoever of Schaudeck's medications or their side effects. 
 
It is undisputed that Schaudeck suffered from Hodgkin's 
Disease and that the medications used to treat the disease 
can have numerous side effects. When considering the side 
effects of treatment, the regulations instruct: 
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       Effects of therapy. Significant posttherapeutic 
       residuals, not specifically included in the category of 
       impairments for malignant neoplasms, should be 
       evaluated according to the affected body system. 
 
        Where the impairment is not listed in the Listing of 
       Impairments and is not medically equivalent to a listed 
       impairment, the impact of any residual impairment 
       including that caused by therapy must be considered. 
       The therapeutic regimen and consequent adverse 
       response to therapy may vary widely; therefore, each 
       case must be considered on an individual basis. It is 
       essential to obtain a specific description of the 
       therapeutic regimen, including the drugs given, dosage, 
       frequency of drug administration, and plans for 
       continued drug administration. It is necessary to obtain 
       a description of the complications or any other adverse 
       response to therapy such as nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, 
       weakness, dermatologic disorders, or reactive mental 
       disorders. 
 
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, S 13.00D (emphasis 
added). 
 
The record demonstrates that Schaudeck's chemotherapy 
regimen consisted of several drugs, including, 
Mechlorethamine (also known as Mustard), Oncovin (or 
Vincristine), Procarbazine, Prednisone, Kytril, Ativan, 
Decadron, Compazine, and G-CSF (granulocyte colony 
stimulating factor). App. 239, 280-99. The known side 
effects of these drugs are severe,3 thus Schaudeck's 
treatment coincided with the pain and weakness to which 
she testified. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Among the numerous common side effects for these drugs are: for 
mechlorethamine, severe nausea, bone marrow depression and 
gastrointestinal symptoms; for Oncovin, neuritic pain (due to nerve 
inflammation) and muscle wasting; for Ativan, somnolence (unnatural 
drowsiness); for Decadron, muscle weakness and loss of muscle mass; 
for Compazine, drowsiness; for G-CSF, bone pain. See Dorland's 
Illustrated Medical Dictionary 535 (Neupogen, a G-CSF), 990 
(mechlorethamine) (1988); Physician's Desk Reference 1625 (Oncovin), 
1771 (Decadron), 3038 (Compazine), 3269 (Ativan), (53d ed. 1999). 
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Schaudeck was taking the numerous drugs that made up 
her chemotherapy regimen well after the date on which the 
ALJ found her no longer disabled. Yet, the ALJ did not 
indicate why he believed that Schaudeck's condition could 
have improved when she was continuing to take the same 
debilitating drugs.4 
 
Second, the ALJ failed to explain why he would rely on 
the post-August 31, 1994 doctors' reports that Schaudeck 
was feeling fine, see ALJ's Decision at 2, when similar 
statements appeared in doctors' reports throughout her 
treatment, including during the period that the ALJ found 
Schaudeck was suffering from a severe impairment. There 
is no obvious logical reason to differentiate between these 
similar statements that appear throughout her medical 
treatment, and the ALJ offered none. 
 
The ALJ's failure in this regard is particularly troubling 
in light of the fact that Schaudeck testified that she always 
told the doctors that she was feeling fine because 
"everybody [at the clinic] knows what the problems are. . . . 
They know being sick is just normal . . . Those problems 
are all normal in that situation. Everybody is sick like that. 
That's the normal thing. . . . [W]hen you say okay, it's just 
okay for what you're going through." App. at 165-66. 
Although we normally defer to the ALJ's decision not to 
credit a claimant, here, that decision is logically unsound. 
There was no reason for the ALJ to accept some of 
Schaudeck's statements as proof that she was not disabled 
while ignoring identical statements made during the time 
period that the ALJ determined that she was disabled. 
 
Where competent evidence supports a claimant's claims, 
the ALJ must explicitly weigh the evidence, see 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Schaudeck also asserts that the ALJ's finding that she had sought 
"only limited modalities of treatment for the alleged pain and limitation, 
and does not take medication for the impairment," app. 127, was 
erroneous. Here, the ALJ may have been referring to Schaudeck's 
decision not to seek treatment beyond the chemotherapy, but he did not 
explain this. It is clear that Schaudeck declined to seek certain 
treatment after her chemotherapy ended. However, this is another 
instance in which the ALJ did not make clear what evidence he was 
relying on to form his conclusion. 
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Dobrowolski, 606 F.2d at 407, and explain a rejection of the 
evidence. See Benton ex rel. Benton v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 85, 
88 (3d Cir. 1987). By failing to consider the drugs that 
Schaudeck was taking throughout her chemotherapy 
treatment and make "a thorough discussion and analysis of 
the objective medical . . . evidence" S.S.R. 95-5P, 1995 WL 
670415, at *2, the ALJ erred. On remand, the ALJ must 
give a clear and logical statement of the facts supporting 
his conclusions.5 
 
III. 
 
We conclude that the ALJ applied an erroneous definition 
of "controlled by" and that he erred by failing to properly 
consider the evidence of record and adequately explain his 
decision. As a result, we will reverse the District Court's 
order and remand the cause to the District Court with 
instructions to remand to the Commissioner of Social 
Security, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Schaudeck also asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to consider her 
non-exertional impairments. These are impairments that do not affect a 
claimant's physical strength but may nevertheless prevent them from 
engaging in gainful employment. See, e.g., Stunkard v. Secretary of 
Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 60 (3d Cir. 1988). Because we are 
remanding the cause for the reasons discussed, we need not reach this 
issue. 
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